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Introduction
Regulatory approaches and prin-ciples of economic and financial governance have increasingly 
been questioned in the wake of the 2008 
crisis (Tonkiss 2009; Amable et al. 2010; 
Lodge and Wegrich 2010; Vibert 2011; 
Baker 2013; Black 2013a; 2013b; Beckert 
2013; Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). The 
diverse body of the literature shares the 
insight that the crisis has exposed vari-
ous shortcomings pertaining to the de-
sign of regulatory market interventions. 
Although, it is still contested whether the 
crisis will lead to the emergence of a new 
regulatory paradigm (Levi-Faur and Park-
er 2010; Vogel 2010; Baker 2013), scholars 
have begun to revise their conceptions of 
how market actors interact (Black 2013a) 
and many innovative ideas have (re)en-
tered the scientific discourse in recent 
years. An important strand of ideas has 
developed around a “sociological optic” 
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In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, scholars have begun to revise their 
conceptions of how market participants interact. While the traditional 
“rationalist optic” posits market participants who are able to process decision-
relevant information and thereby transform uncertainty into quantifiable risks, 
the increasingly popular “sociological optic” stresses the role of uncertainty 
in expectation formation and social conventions for creating confidence in 
markets. Applications of the sociological optic to concrete regulatory problems 
are still limited. By subjecting both optics to the same regulatory problem—the 
role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their ratings in capital markets—this 
paper provides insights into whether the sociological optic offers advice to tackle 
concrete regulatory problems and discusses the potential of the sociological 
optic in complementing the rationalist optic. The empirical application suggests 
that the sociological optic is not only able to improve our understanding of the 
role of CRAs and their ratings, but also to provide solutions complementary to 
those posited by the rationalist optic.
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of market action which counters the more 
traditional “rationalist optic” (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2014). While the rationalist 
optic posits market participants who can 
process decision-relevant information 
and thereby transform uncertainty into 
quantifiable risks, the sociological op-
tic assumes that uncertainties cannot be 
readily transformed into risks. Instead, 
the sociological optic claims that conven-
tions and social relations are needed to 
stabilize the expectations of market par-
ticipants made under uncertainty and to 
thereby create confidence in markets.
 While the sociological optic has 
been discussed from a theoretical per-
spective, applications to concrete regula-
tory problems are still limited. The pres-
ent paper aims to contribute to filling this 
gap. By subjecting the sociological and 
the rationalist optic to the same empirical 
problem—the role of credit rating agen-
cies (CRAs) and their ratings in global 
capital markets—we attempt to provide 
insights into whether the sociological op-
tic offers practical advice to tackle actu-
al regulatory problems and whether the 
solutions suggested by the sociological 
optic complement those suggested by the 
rationalist optic. The present paper thus 
stands in line with George and Bennett 
(2005, chapter 12), who call for more 
transformation of scientific knowledge 
into policy applicable knowledge.
 The paper proceeds as follows: 
using social learning theory (Hall 1993), 
we first illustrate that the rationalist optic 
developed as a consequence of the para-
digmatic shift from the Keynesian welfare 
state to the regulatory state. Discussing 
implications of this shift, we then demon-
strate how the rationalist optic translates 
into a regulatory toolbox that has trouble 
addressing cases of market failure where 
uncertainty undermines confidence be-
tween market participants. Subsequently, 
we illustrate that, in contrast to the ratio-
nalist optic, the sociological optic pays 
particular attention to the impact of un-
certainty on the expectation formation of 
market participants. We then outline the 
contours of a regulatory approach that 
engages with the development of confi-
dence between market participants by 
stabilizing their expectations formed un-
der uncertainty. In the empirical part, we 
subject both optics to the same regulato-
ry problem, namely the role of CRAs and 
their ratings in global capital markets. 
The role of CRAs in capital markets and 
the consequences that emanate from their 
decision-making represent a tricky regu-
latory problem for which encompassing 
solutions are hard to find. Our empirical 
application suggests that the sociological 
optic is not only able to improve our un-
derstanding of the role of CRAs and their 
ratings, but also to provide solutions that 
are complementary to those posited by 
the rationalist optic.
The Paradigmatic Shift from the 
Keynesian Welfare State to the 
Regulatory State
The regulatory state is common-ly conceived as successor to the Keynesian welfare state (Majone 
1997; Yeung 2010). Whereas the welfare 
state redistributes, engages in macroeco-
nomic stabilization and deficit spending, 
the regulatory state concentrates on cor-
recting market failures and making rules 
(Majone 1997, 149). Even if a strict dis-
tinction between welfare and regulatory 
state may be challenged (Levi-Faur 2011; 
Braithwaite 2008, 4-12), the distinction 
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still clarifies that the shift in the under-
standing of the state has not only been 
caused by factual necessities, but also by 
a conceptual reinterpretation of the capi-
talist system.
 The fundamental difference be-
tween the Keynesian welfare state and 
the regulatory state can be explained by 
recurring to the idea of policy paradigm 
shifts (Hall 1993). This approach stress-
es the role of ideas in policymaking by 
studying the process of social learning. 
Hall (1993) defines social learning as “a 
deliberate attempt to adjust the goals or 
techniques of policy in response to past 
experience and new information” (278). 
The centrality of ideas in social learning 
stems from the assumption that “policy-
makers customarily work within a frame-
work of ideas and standards that speci-
fies not only the goals of policy and the 
kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of 
the problems they are meant to be ad-
dressing” (Hall 1993, 279). These “policy 
paradigms” hold together and explain the 
specific configurations of three variables: 
policy goals, policy instruments, and spe-
cific settings of instruments. When not 
only the applied instruments and their 
settings, but also policy goals change, a 
paradigm shift occurs.
 The shift from the Keynesian 
welfare state to the regulatory state rep-
resents such a paradigm shift (Hall 1993, 
284). While the state’s creative pow-
er and ability to steer the economy had 
enjoyed widespread public confidence 
until the 1970s, skepticism toward the 
state’s capacity in stabilizing the economy 
subsequently grew across nearly all po-
litical colors. Negative consequences of 
resource-consuming state interventions, 
like rising sovereign debts or inefficient 
market interventions, threatened the 
Keynesian paradigm, which found one of 
its fiercest critics in the theory of neolib-
eralism (Castles et al. 2010).
 Fundamental to this paradig-
matic shift is a particular idea of how 
market dynamics and policy choices are 
framed—an idea that Nelson and Kat-
zenstein (2014, 364) call “rationalist op-
tic.” This optic accords a prominent role 
to markets and their self-regulating ca-
pabilities, implying a state that “governs 
at a distance” (Yeung 2010). Emblematic 
of the rationalist optic’s trust in the allo-
cating powers of markets is the efficient 
market hypothesis (EMH), which has 
come to dominate large parts of econom-
ic regulation (Moloney 2010; Baker 2013; 
Black 2013a). In general, the EMH as-
serts that markets can operate on a basis 
where prices reflect all available informa-
tion (Fama 1970). Market failure can thus 
occur only when prices do not reflect the 
intrinsic value of a traded product, and 
consequently, market participants do not 
dispose of sufficient information to make 
1 An example for this kind of market failure is Akerlof ’s (1970) “market for lemons,” where dishonest car 
sellers drive out the honest sellers leaving only bad cars (lemons) for sale. Since information about the 
true quality of cars is distributed asymmetrically between sellers and buyers, the latter will rationally pay 
a maximum price equal to the average price of all cars on offer. This brings sellers of cars with intrinsic 
value above the average price to exit the market, leaving behind a “market for lemons.” Insufficient 
information about the quality of products on the side of potential buyers thus leads to market failure.
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well-informed, rational decisions1. The 
rationalist idea of markets and explana-
tions for their failure translate into a spe-
cific design and application of regulatory 
interventions, which will be discussed in 
the next section.
Comparing the Rationalist and 
the Sociological Optic from a The-
oretical Perspective
The rationalist optic assumes that rational market participants can transform uncertainties into cal-
culable risks if they dispose of sufficient 
information (Hutter 2010). By improving 
“the availability of information” (OECD 
2008, 6), regulatory interventions in-
tend that prices better reflect the intrin-
sic value of a product and that risks can 
be accurately incorporated into prices. 
Emphasis is thus put on regulatory inter-
ventions that “complete” a market by im-
proving the information available to mar-
ket participants. This can be achieved, 
for instance, by taxing a product in a way 
that reflects the fundamental value of the 
product (OECD 2008) or by enforcing 
forms of mandatory disclosure (Moloney 
2010). These examples highlight an im-
portant rationale for regulatory interven-
tions based on a rationalist optic, namely 
that the market can be completed by pro-
viding information. In other words, a ra-
tionalist optic assumes that it is sufficient 
to remove information constraints to im-
prove market functioning.
 When the rationalist optic does 
not equate uncertainty with risk (Nel-
son and Katzenstein 2014, 365), it takes 
uncertainty to be policy induced. Uncer-
tainty is then regarded as an undesired 
“side effect” that is unintentionally but 
actively created by regulatory interven-
tions. Scholars have discussed the poten-
tial impact of policy-induced uncertain-
ty on economic growth, investment, and 
employment (Julio and Yook 2012; Bak-
er et al. 2013). “Regulatory” uncertainty’ 
caused by regulatory interventions in the 
aftermath of crisis and its potential influ-
ence on growth and job creation also fig-
ure in contemporary work (e.g. Battalio 
and Schultz 2011; Kingsley et al. 2012). 
What the rationalist optic assumes is that, 
in principle, policy-induced uncertainty 
can be reduced by providing sophisticat-
ed regulatory interventions.
 The sociological optic criticizes 
regulatory interventions based on a ratio-
nalist optic for neglecting cases of market 
failure where confidence between market 
participants is undermined by uncertain-
ty. Given the limited capabilities of mar-
ket participants to process decision-rele-
vant information in complex information 
environments, market action can be sig-
nificantly and enduringly distorted (Blyth 
2006; Beckert 2013). The financial sys-
tem, in particular, has become too com-
plex to allow for unproblematic informa-
tion processing (Best 2010). According to 
the sociological optic, uncertainty in de-
cision making is far more important and 
widespread than the rationalist optic and 
its efficient market understanding would 
assume (March 1994; Nelson and Katzen-
stein 2014).
 Borrowing from the Keynesian 
paradigm, the sociological optic claims 
that uncertainty has a significant impact 
on expectation formation and the sub-
sequent behavior of market participants 
(Dequech 2006; Beckert 2013). The latter 
base their decisions on expectations re-
garding future outcomes and, depending 
on the decision-making situation, they 
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can (or cannot) determine potential out-
comes or even the probability that such 
outcomes occur. Accordingly, rational 
expectations based on informed calcula-
tions can often not be formed. Instead, 
actors are compelled to make decisions 
and arrange themselves with the unpre-
dictability of some future events (Nelson 
and Katzenstein 2014, 366). To put it in 
Keynes’ (1937) words, sometimes “there 
is no scientific basis on which to form any 
calculable probability whatever. We sim-
ply do not know” (213-214).
 In a state of uncertainty2, expec-
tations are thus not “determined through 
calculation of optimal choices taking into 
account all available information, but 
rather are based on contingent interpre-
tations of the situation in the context of 
prevailing institutional structures, cultur-
al templates, and social networks” (Beck-
ert 2013, 325). The Keynesian paradigm 
acknowledges that sudden and unexpect-
ed events can lead to uncertainty, which 
unsettles market participants and there-
by influences their expectations and their 
disposition to invest or consume (Keynes 
1936, 316). The Keynesian solution to 
reverse this suboptimal situation is to 
manage uncertainty via governmental 
interventions which aim to stabilize the 
expectations of market participants and 
restore confidence in markets.
 There are at least four areas where 
the expectation formation of market par-
ticipants under uncertainty is constitu-
tive for the expansive dynamics of capi-
talist systems and can thus be targeted by 
governmental interventions (Sewell 2008; 
Beckert 2013, 327-340). First, in order 
to expand, markets depend on creativity. 
Creativity can only be transformed into 
concrete innovations if market partici-
pants develop concrete “imaginaries” of 
the future. Only in environments, where 
market participants are encouraged to be-
lieve that innovation development is re-
warded, growth-enhancing new products 
and services can be developed. Second, 
modern capitalist systems are credit-driv-
en and therefore rely on the development 
of confidence between borrowers and 
creditors. Therefore, markets must “suc-
ceed in creating the expectation in capital 
owners that the promise entailed in the 
credit relation will indeed be honored” 
(Beckert 2013, 332). Third, commodifi-
cation describes the transformation of 
goods into tradable products. For goods 
to be tradable, they must contain a (sym-
bolic) value for potential buyers. The val-
ue relies on personal expectations regard-
ing the future performance of the good. 
Fourth, markets are driven by the compe-
tition for profit opportunities. This leads 
to the questions of “how expectations 
regarding opportunities for profit are 
created in competitive markets” (Beckert 
2013, 339) and how a fair competition en-
vironment can be secured.
 In these four areas of capitalist 
systems, individual expectation forma-
tion under uncertainty plays a major role. 
The release of innovation, confidence for 
credit relations, value assignments, and 
expected profit opportunities cannot be 
understood without considering expec-
tation formation under uncertainty. Ac-
2 Note that the Keynesian understanding of uncertainty is different from Frank Knight’s (2006 [1921]) 
conception of the term (Best 2008). Keynes deduces a specific logic of governmental intervention from 
his understanding of uncertainty, which is of central relevance here. 
76
Hinterleitner & Rosser: Regulation and the Management of Expectations
cordingly, influencing “the decisions of 
actors by shaping their expectations, in-
cluding the shaping of the social and po-
litical structures underlying these expec-
tations, becomes one of the main tasks of 
political regulators” (Beckert 2013, 326). 
Social conventions, understood as shared 
understandings that organize and coordi-
nate actions, deserve particular attention, 
since they help to predict behavior and 
thereby stabilize uncertain environments 
(Biggart and Beamish 2003; Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2014). Following the socio-
logical optic, regulatory interventions 
should not solely focus on the manage-
ment of various kinds of risks, but also 
proactively target uncertainty in (1) inno-
vation development, (2) credit relations, 
(3) value assignments, and (4) profit op-
portunities. For this purpose, regulators 
need to elicit where market participants’ 
expectations are susceptible to uncertain-
ties, and if possible, stimulate the forma-
tion of structures and conventions which 
are able to stabilize these uncertainties3.
 While the sociological optic has 
been discussed from a theoretical per-
spective, it has rarely been applied to con-
crete regulatory problems. Moreover, it is 
not yet clear whether the sociological and 
the rationalist optic suggest solutions to 
regulatory problems that can be fruitful-
ly combined. In what follows, we discuss 
the problematic role of CRAs and their 
decision making from both a rationalist 
and a sociological perspective in order to 
address this research gap.
Applying the Rationalist and the 
Sociological Optic to the Case of 
Credit Rating Agencies
The case of CRAs has been chosen because of its theoretical prom-inence in the literature. In fact, 
the area in which confidence has been 
most affected by the 2008 crisis is that of 
credit relations (Trampusch 2013). In the 
aftermath of the crisis, CRAs have been 
exposed to heavy criticism, with some 
seeing the current practice of credit rat-
ing as a primary cause of the crisis (Part-
noy 2009). Criticism frequently pertains 
to the poor quality of ratings, the opacity 
surrounding rating decisions, conflict of 
interest, and the lack of competition be-
tween CRAs (Eijffinger 2012). However, 
comprehensively reforming the current 
practice of credit rating has so far prov-
en elusive. It thus appears that the role 
of CRAs and their decision making rep-
resents a tricky regulatory problem. We, 
in the following, present the various 
problems associated with CRAs and their 
ratings, followed by a critical discussion 
of solutions posited by a rationalist optic. 
Finally, the problems with CRAs are ana-
lyzed through a sociological optic in or-
der to establish whether it offers practical 
advice to address the outlined problems.
3 Note that the sociological optic discussed here applies a somewhat different perspective on regulatory 
problems than macro-prudential regulation, which has also gained traction in recent years: While macro-
prudential regulation also rejects the efficient market hypothesis dominant in pre-crisis regulatory 
approaches, is concerned with systemic risk at the system level, and focuses on pro-cyclicality (Baker 
2013), the sociological optic focuses on the impact of uncertainty on individual expectation formation 
at the micro-level.
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The role of CRAs and their ratings in global 
capital markets
 CRAs are a particular kind of in-
formation providing intermediaries in 
financial markets. Traditionally, market 
participants were brought together by 
banks, which collected funds from cred-
itors and lent these to adequate borrow-
ers. In recent years, however, a process 
of “disintermediation” can be observed: 
“Depositors have found more attractive 
things to do with their money at the same 
time as borrowers have increasingly bor-
rowed from nonbank sources” (Sinclair 
2001, 444). In globalized capital markets, 
information about creditworthiness can 
no longer be provided by banks alone. 
Instead, they are flanked by CRAs, which 
issue “a corporate family-level opinion 
of the relative likelihood that any entity 
within a corporate family will default on 
one or more of its long-term debt obliga-
tions” (Moody’s 2009, 18). Credit ratings 
have become an integral part of modern 
finance in both the United States and 
Europe, where bank-based coordinated 
market economies have substituted for-
mer non-market institutions by external 
rating practices (Carruthers and Kim 
2011; Trampusch 2013).
 Credit ratings are supposed to 
reduce uncertainties in decision making 
about credit (Carruthers 2013). CRAs 
assess and structure complex informa-
tion, transform uncertainties into calcu-
lable risks and, as a consequence, provide 
single grades (complemented by rating 
watches and outlooks) indicating the risk 
of default. CRAs thus act as “institution-
al trust devices” (Beckert 2013) that help 
market participants build more adequate 
expectations about the financial and eco-
nomic constitution of their trading part-
ners. Theoretically, ratings are therefore 
considered as uncertainty-reducing de-
vices that support confidence develop-
ment between market participants, there-
by stimulating the expansive dynamics on 
which capitalist systems rely.
 However, during the recent cri-
sis, CRAs failed across corporate families 
to adequately assess credit risk (Partnoy 
2009). The rapid downgrades of top-rat-
ed products to junk status emphasized 
the fact that ratings did not make uncer-
tainties more tractable. Instead of helping 
market participants form adequate ex-
pectations about credit risk, CRAs were 
unable to commodify credit risk in ways 
that properly depict contained uncertain-
ties and risks. Consequently, CRAs did 
not act as institutional trust devices sup-
porting confidence development between 
market participants.
 In the face of this problem, the 
rationalist optic presumes that market 
participants invest in information to 
avoid systematic mistakes (Nelson and 
Katzenstein 2014). If information can be 
distributed among market participants, 
their expectations “about possible future 
states of the economy should converge 
and promote a stable and self-reinforcing 
equilibrium” (Blyth 2003, 243). From a 
rationalist point of view, the primary task 
of regulators is thus to ensure that CRAs 
provide correct and up-to-date informa-
tion on rated entities. CRAs are thereby 
supposed to increase the transparency 
of the financial system so that informa-
tion can be adequately incorporated into 
market prices. In this context, studies 
informed by a rationalist optic have sug-
gested to target the lack of transparency 
of ratings, the lack of competition be-
tween CRAs, their problematic business 
model, and the regulatory use of ratings.
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The lack of transparency
 Rating processes are frequently 
criticized for being insufficiently trans-
parent and objective (Sinclair 1994; 2005; 
Bruner and Abdelal 2005; Iyengar 2010). 
It is claimed that more publicly available 
information about rating processes could 
enhance the understanding of final ratings 
and help market participants form better 
expectations about the creditworthiness 
of rated entities. Although CRAs usually 
publish so called “rating methodologies” 
or “guidelines”4 and explanations of spe-
cific rating decisions, these documents are 
very general and depend to a large degree 
on the personal opinions of the assess-
ment teams (Sinclair 1994; Iyengar 2010). 
Moreover, neither do CRAs state the rel-
ative weighting of the factors relevant to 
the rating, nor can these factors always be 
quantified (Cantor and Packer 1996; Ei-
jffinger 2012).
 In reply to this criticism, CRAs un-
derscore that their business model heavily 
depends on secrecy. They hold that more 
transparency would allow clients to in-
fluence rating decisions, thereby damag-
ing the CRAs’ highly valued reputation 
for neutrality. This argument contains 
some truth; more transparency would 
allow rated entities to “game the system” 
by applying strategies to get better ratings 
without ameliorating creditworthiness 
(Partnoy 2006; Róna-Tas and Hiß 2010). 
Hence, “CRAs resist fiercely any attempts 
to make them more transparent” (Kerw-
er 2005, 469)5. Even if regulatory inter-
ventions could increase transparency by 
providing more information about rating 
procedures, market participants would 
not necessarily be able to incorporate all 
this information into their expectations. 
Large parts of the financial system have 
become too complex and the contained 
information too unclear to be both ade-
quately depicted and correctly interpret-
ed by market participants (Best 2010; Hu 
2012). In a nutshell, a regulatory response 
aiming to increase the transparency of 
rating processes collides with a business 
model built on secrecy and cannot guar-
antee that market participants are able to 
use information on rating processes to en-
hance their understanding of final ratings.
The lack of competition
 The current organization of cred-
it rating is often criticized for its oligop-
olistic market structure dominated by 
the three major U.S. agencies (Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s, and to a lesser extent 
Fitch Ratings). This lack of competition, 
it is argued, is responsible for a signifi-
cant herd mentality between the agencies 
(Gaillard 2011) and poor rating quality. 
Greater competition could lead to im-
proved ratings, since erroneous ratings 
would be “policed” by the market. This 
4 See for instance: http://www.standardandpoors.com/ratings/sovresearch/en/us (retrieved: August 1, 
2015).
5 It may alternatively be argued that the lack of transparency is generally overrated and, therefore, does 
not lie at the core of low-quality ratings. Not only did CRAs provide access to the rating methodology 
of some structured financial instruments. They also handed over their rating algorithms on CD to 
the issuers who could then tweak their products accordingly. Also, some investment banks hire CRA 
employees to inform them about the rating process.
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could reduce the overall likelihood of 
CRAs producing faulty ratings and make 
ratings more accurate in depicting uncer-
tainties and risks.
 However, as the difficulty to es-
tablish an influential European CRA sug-
gests, market entry barriers for potential 
competitors are high (White 2002). In 
addition, competition cannot assume its 
“policing function” when there is a reg-
ulatory use of ratings. Regulators have 
gradually adopted credit ratings for reg-
ulatory purposes and the management of 
market risks. Not only are ratings used to 
define investment restrictions for finan-
cial institutions such as pension funds. 
They also serve to determine disclosure 
requirements and capital reserve require-
ments according to the presumed risk ex-
posure of financial institutions (Pagano 
and Volpin 2010; White 2010; Carruthers 
and Kim 2011).
 This regulatory use of ratings rep-
resents a significant market entry barrier 
for potential competitors, since not all 
ratings are deemed sound enough by reg-
ulators to provide an adequate estimate 
for credit risk. For instance, only credit 
ratings issued by CRAs that have been 
accorded the special status of nationally 
recognized statistical rating organizations 
by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission qualify for regulatory use. This 
creates an artificial demand for credit 
ratings issued by firmly established CRAs 
that is not conditional upon the actual 
quality of ratings. Therefore, “ratings no 
longer function as opinions to be taken or 
left by investors, and market discipline is 
accordingly sacrificed” (Bruner and Ab-
delal 2005, 202). Put differently, regulators 
have endowed CRAs with a legal authori-
ty that translates into an authoritativeness 
of ratings which is not conditional on the 
actual quality of ratings.
 Another point that speaks against 
a beneficial effect of increased competi-
tion on the quality of ratings is the prob-
lematic “issuer pays” business model of 
current rating practices. Since CRAs get 
paid by the entities they are supposed to 
rate, they are subject to a conflict of in-
terests, making objective rating more 
difficult (Bolton et al. 2012). Increased 
competition may thus increase the CRAs’ 
eagerness to appease their customers by 
doling out generous ratings. In conclu-
sion, providing market participants with 
better ratings by boosting competition is 
difficult because of high market entry bar-
riers, which are increased even further by 
the widespread regulatory use of ratings, 
and a problematic “issuer pays” business 
model.
The dependence on CRAs
 Given low rating quality, it has 
also been proposed to increase oversight 
and supervision of CRAs, if not to trans-
form the practice of credit rating into a 
public service (Paudyn 2011). However, a 
more active engagement of governments 
is inopportune for a couple of reasons. 
First, the adoption of a resource-intensive 
task is not very enticing for states plagued 
by austerity, because the regulation of 
market risk is immensely complex and 
requires significant resources from public 
regulators. Second, increased oversight is 
unattractive, because the supervisor can 
easily be “held responsible for the ratings” 
(Eijffinger 2012, 915). In fact, the out-
sourcing of delicate tasks and decisions 
represents a typical blame-avoidance 
strategy (Hinterleitner 2015; Hinterleit-
ner and Sager 2015). Whenever CRAs err, 
a scapegoat is easily available.
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 Taken together, this analysis of 
regulatory interventions informed by the 
rationalist optic not only reveals that reg-
ulators depend on CRAs. It also suggests 
that it is unlikely that more transparency 
and competition can improve the qual-
ity of credit ratings and thereby provide 
market participants with more adequate 
information. The only straightforward 
solution that results from the preceding 
analysis is to limit the regulatory use of 
ratings to a reasonable extent. However, 
this solution alone cannot guarantee that 
CRAs issue high-quality ratings and that 
market participants can better under-
stand those ratings. In the next section, 
we discuss whether the sociological optic 
may complement the rationalist optic to 
improve the quality of credit ratings.
Why credit ratings hide uncertainty
 Credit ratings in their current form 
are essentially based on a rationalist optic, 
since they convey that all uncertainties 
and risks relevant to the creditworthiness 
of an entity can be condensed into a single 
representative grade that states the risk of 
default (Carruthers 2013). By transform-
ing uncertainties into default risks, un-
certainties are “absorbed,” suggesting that 
they have been eliminated. Uncertainty 
absorption “takes place when inferences 
are drawn from a body of evidence and 
the inferences, instead of the evidence it-
self, are then communicated” (March and 
Simon 1993, 186). This process of uncer-
tainty absorption removes assumptions, 
discretion and ambiguity, producing a 
rating that appears much more robust and 
authoritative than it actually is (Espeland 
and Stevens 2008). From this perspective, 
ratings are not uncertainty-reducing de-
vices, but rather “uncertainty-downplay-
ing comfort certi-ficates” (Power 1997).
 Market participants may thus 
neglect uncertainties when consulting a 
credit rating to form their expectations 
about an entity’s creditworthiness. This is 
unproblematic in times of well-function-
ing markets when no one actually wants 
(and needs) to know the uncertainties 
hidden behind single ratings. However, 
when sudden and unexpected events un-
settle market participants, single ratings 
lose their uncertainty-downplaying qual-
ities and force market participants to take 
all those re-emerging uncertainties into 
account and adapt their expectations ac-
cordingly. The rapid downgrades of previ-
ously top-rated subprime products in the 
2008 crisis demonstrate how single-grade 
ratings suddenly lost their sedative effect 
and compelled market participants to 
radically adapt their expectations about 
creditworthiness, leading to an abrupt 
change in market behavior.
 The sociological optic thus reveals 
that CRAs do not manage uncertainties 
by transforming them into risks, but only 
temporarily hide them behind a “simple 
set of comparative symbols” (Bruner and 
Abdelal 2005, 210). The focus on uncer-
tainty and its role in expectation forma-
tion deepens the understanding of the 
problematic practice of credit rating, be-
cause it elucidates the conventional usage 
of ratings and the negative potential for 
confidence development between market 
participants. This finding contradicts a 
rationalist optic, which suggests that un-
certainties can be transformed into calcu-
lable risks and are thus not of much rel-
evance for the formation of expectations 
(Best 2008).
 If combined, the rationalist and 
the sociological optic illustrate how the 
authoritativeness of ratings brought about 
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by their regulatory use and the uncertain-
ty-downplaying presentation of ratings in 
single-grade form can develop negative 
potential in combination with uncertain-
ty. If ratings were not overly authoritative, 
the single-grade presentation would be 
unproblematic, since ratings would only 
represent “opinions” (in Moody’s termi-
nology). Accordingly, market participants 
would not attach too much importance to 
the ratings of CRAs. Similarly, if ratings 
adequately depicted both risks and uncer-
tainties, their authoritativeness would be 
less problematic. In conjunction, howev-
er, a state of uncertainty, the presentation 
of ratings in single-grade form, and the 
authoritativeness of ratings develop nega-
tive potential for confidence development 
between market participants (see Figure 
1).
Policy implications
 The preceding analysis suggests 
that two issues must be targeted. On one 
hand, the rationalist optic suggests to tar-
get the authoritativeness of ratings on the 
system level by limiting their regulatory 
use. On the other hand, the sociological 
optic suggests stabilizing uncertainties by 
addressing the uncertainty-ignoring con-
ventional usage of credit ratings on the 
micro-level.
The system-level: reducing the authori-ta-
tiveness of ratings
 Regulatory interventions must 
make sure that market participants do not 
solely rely on the estimates of CRAs to as-
sess the financial and economic constitu-
Figure 1: Prerequisites for the negative potential of credit ratings
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tion of trading partners. In order to achieve 
this purpose, it has been proposed to limit 
the regulatory use of ratings to a reason-
able extent and make capital markets more 
resilient to occasional “shocks” coming 
from CRAs’ ratings. An example that con-
siders both aspects can be found in current 
reform efforts by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS), influenced 
by a macro-prudential approach to regu-
lation. In the BCBS’s Basel III agreements, 
a package of reforms intended to make 
banking organizations more resilient by 
augmenting both the quality and quantity 
of their capital, the BCBS attempts to limit 
the regulatory use of ratings (BCBS 2010). 
Basel III proposes alternatives to credit 
ratings for banks to determine their cred-
it-risk exposure. Accordingly, in the case 
of an erroneous rating, it would be more 
unlikely that banks, which use this rating 
for the calculation of their capital require-
ments for credit risk, suddenly lack capital 
to cover the latter. In order to make cap-
ital markets more resilient to occasional 
“shocks” coming from CRAs’ ratings, the 
reform package includes higher capital ra-
tios as well as additional countercyclical 
capital conservation buffers for unexpect-
ed losses. Higher capital ratios make banks 
more resilient for situations in which sud-
den rating changes force them to signifi-
cantly readjust their expectations6.
The micro-level: disclosing uncertainties 
properly
 A limited regulatory use of ratings 
needs to be flanked by interventions tar-
geting the conventional usage of ratings 
as “uncertainty-downplaying comfort 
certificates.” Regulators need to help mar-
ket participants change their belief that a 
credit rating is not only an authoritative 
measure for credit risk, but that the rating 
also represents a picture for uncertainty. 
This can be achieved by ensuring that the 
uncertainties and risks contained in a sin-
gle-grade rating are not “absorbed” (and 
thereby hidden), but disclosed properly. 
This would support market participants to 
better consider the uncertainties that are 
relevant for an entity’s creditworthiness 
when they form their expectations.
 A useful proposal is that of estab-
lishing a “bifurcation” in the presentation 
of qualitative and quantitative aspects of a 
credit rating. In addition to the traditional 
rating containing qualitative data and in-
terpretations, a rating that is solely based 
on quantitative data could be published 
(Bruner and Abdelal 2005). By comparing 
both ratings, market participants could 
better assess the degree of subjectivity and 
judgment contained in the rating. More-
over, CRAs may be obliged to publish an 
additional fan chart that sheds light on 
the confidence limits of their forecasts 
(Goodhart 2010).
 Even further go credit risk assess-
ments presented in the style of a sophis-
ticated weather forecast: modern forecasts 
give additional details on general weather 
patterns, rainfall probabilities, and wind 
speeds. In a similar vein, CRAs could be 
brought to publish additional informa-
tion on single-grade credit ratings, en-
compassing confidence intervals of their 
6 Reform efforts going in the same direction but lacking impetus have been proposed and advanced on a 
larger scale by the Financial Stabilities Board (FSB 2012).
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estimates, the influence of macro-level 
economic and political phenomena on 
the default probability, the developments 
that were especially difficult to judge, what 
kind of non-quantifiable developments 
(i.e. uncertainties) entered the rating, etc. 
Such ratings would not make the impres-
sion of an absolute and definite fact, but 
of an estimate tainted with uncertainties 
and judgments; more subjective opinion 
than objective truth. This does not mean 
to simply overwhelm market participants 
with more information they may not be 
able to handle, but to give a more realistic 
impression of the subjectivity of ratings. 
Market participants would interpret rat-
ings with greater caution, get a better grasp 
on the contained uncertainties, and could 
integrate them into their expectation for-
mation from the outset7.
 Finally, a positive side effect of 
properly disclosing relevant uncertainties 
would be that reputation-based compe-
tition between CRAs is enhanced, since 
their qualitative assessments of uncertain-
ties could be evaluated retrospectively. As 
noted earlier, competition between CRAs 
is hard to establish because of high mar-
ket entry barriers and a problematic “issu-
er pays” business model. But the fact that 
the current oligopolistic market structure 
leads to a significant herd mentality char-
acterized by high correlations between rat-
ings also stems from the categorical pre-
sentation of ratings in single-grade form. 
The single-grade form does not allow for 
nuances to be adequately expressed and 
thus precludes an area of judgment where 
CRAs could compete. Competition in 
properly picturing uncertainties would 
grant authoritativeness in the assessment 
of risks and uncertainties not by regulato-
ry decree, but for a competence otherwise 
hidden by the single grade.
Discussion
As the previous analysis has re-vealed, an approach that analyzes the current practice of credit rating 
from a sociological point of view leads to a 
better understanding of the convention-
al usage of credit ratings and the negative 
consequences for expectation formation 
that emanate therefrom. If one exclusively 
adopts the rationalist optic, which assumes 
that uncertainties do not play a significant 
role in the expectation formation of mar-
ket participants, because they can be trans-
formed into calculable risks, one cannot 
reveal and properly understand the prob-
lems associated with uncertainty-down-
playing single-grade credit ratings. More-
over, by considering the role of uncertainty 
in actor’s expectation formation, the so-
ciological optic applied here contributes to 
finding solutions where regulatory inter-
ventions such as more transparency or in-
creased market competition do not suffice 
to tackle the issue or simply cannot be put 
into practice. We can thus conclude that in 
the above case, the sociological optic has 
proven useful by providing a deeper un-
derstanding of the regulatory problem.
 Moreover, the case of CRAs 
demonstrates that the sociological optic 
complements, rather than replaces, regu-
latory interventions informed by a ratio-
7 These proposals should not be conflated with qualitative information currently published by CRAs, 
where more nuanced statements can sometimes be found but uncertainties are only disclosed if deemed 
relevant by CRAs.
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nalist optic. As stated above, in complex 
international capital markets, CRAs are 
needed for their information processing 
capacities and the management of credit 
risks—and political realities speak against 
more active states in this field. However, 
the management of credit risks does not 
depend on absorbing uncertainties. In-
stead, uncertainties can be treated as “re-
siduals” that need to be properly disclosed. 
As emphasized here, it is the application of 
both optics that allows for a balanced reg-
ulatory approach—an approach that con-
siders both the authoritativeness of ratings 
brought about by their regulatory use and 
their uncertainty-downplaying qualities.
 What about the wider applicability 
of the sociological optic to concrete regu-
latory problems? The case makes clear that 
this optic does not provide a panacea-like 
new kind of regulation or intervention 
strategy for public authorities. Some ideas 
are already implicitly present in current 
debates and policies, but can profit from 
being discussed explicitly from a socio-
logical point of view. For instance, by con-
trolling price stability and applying the 
instrument of “forward guidance”—based 
on the idea that central banks provide de-
tailed information on their expected future 
behavior—central banks try to manage 
the expectations of market participants. 
The same idea can be observed in current 
accounting reform, targeting excesses in 
“mark-to-market” accounting practices. 
Since accounting firms provide informa-
tion about the financial constitution of 
an economic entity, it is in the interest of 
regulators to ensure that accountants es-
timate their entity’s financial situation as 
accurately as possible. However, Interna-
tional Financial Reporting Standards and 
U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Prin-
ciples have seen a marked shift to “fair” 
(i.e., market price) value accounting in re-
cent years. Fair-value accounting assumes 
that the assets, liabilities, and equity of 
firms can at all times be accurately priced, 
i.e., all uncertainties and risks contained 
in these positions can be transformed 
into single, supposedly “correct” prices. 
This can be hazardous when unexpected 
changes in market prices resulting from 
abrupt changes of expectations force firms 
to quickly adjust their balance sheets (Best 
2010). Hence, fair-value accounting prac-
tices are a potential source of uncertainty 
for market participants who form their 
expectations about an entities financial 
well-being. These examples suggest that an 
approach that explicitly analyses regulato-
ry issues from a sociological perspective 
can be fruitfully applied to other regula-
tory problems. By applying a sociological 
optic to real-world puzzles in the realm 
of economic and financial regulation and 
governance, future research can further 
refine this optic and create generic knowl-
edge about the conditions under which 
it proves particularly useful (George and 
Bennett 2005, chapter 12).
Conclusion
Since the 2008 crisis, regulatory ap-proaches and principles have increas-ingly been drawn into question. This 
paper has retraced how the rationalist op-
tic on markets, going back to a paradigm 
shift associated with the neoliberal turn, 
has recently been challenged by an in-
creasingly popular sociological optic. Bor-
rowing from the Keynesian paradigm, this 
optic stresses the fundamental difference 
between risk and uncertainty, the role of 
uncertainty in expectation formation, and 
the importance of social conventions for 
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stabilizing uncertainty and structuring 
human interaction. Subsequently, the pa-
per has applied both optics to a concrete 
regulatory problem, namely the role of 
CRAs and their ratings in international 
capital markets.
 In conclusion, an approach that 
explicitly targets expectation formation 
under uncertainty can help to analyze 
tricky regulatory problems and comple-
ment conventional regulatory interven-
tions based on a rationalist optic. The 
sociological optic does not only offer “a 
useful analytical lens to complement and 
enrich rationalist explanations and thus 
help[s] us understand the world of risk 
and uncertainty that we all inhabit” (Nel-
son and Katzenstein 2014, 364). It also of-
fers practical advice to tackle actual regu-
latory problems.
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